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A DEFENSE OF A WITTGENSTEINIAN OUTLOOK ON 
TWO POSTMODERN THEORIES 
 
Sarah Halvorson-Fried 
 
Abstract    The way postmodern thinkers deal with issues of 
language and power has been highly influenced by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein‘s later philosophy of language. Wittgenstein‘s 
conception of language as a collection of ―language-games‖ based 
on agreement in use rather than a direct reflection of objective 
reality is central to these issues. In this paper, I will show how this 
Wittgensteinian conception manifests itself in two important 
contemporary theories: the liberal ironism of Richard Rorty and 
the feminist philosophy of Luce Irigaray. I will show how Rorty‘s 
and Irigaray‘s Wittgenstein-influenced theories both bring 
Wittgenstein‘s philosophy of language into a more social context, 
and argue ultimately that through such theories we can better 
understand social issues in our modern world. 
 
Much of postmodern theory deals with issues of language 
and power. According to many postmodern thinkers, most of the 
relationships between language and power go unnoticed, as the 
public usually sees language as a neutral medium within which we 
can communicate. But language has the power to oppress, the 
power to assign identities, the power to liberate. The way 
postmodern thinkers deal with these issues has been highly 
influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein‘s later philosophy of language. 
In this paper, I will show how this influence manifests itself in two 
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important theories: the liberal ironism of Richard Rorty, a 
―distinctive and controversial [pragmatist]‖1 and the feminist 
philosophy of Luce Irigaray, a prominent name in the French 
school of feminism. I will respond to criticisms of Rorty that call 
his theory misrepresentative, and identify the disparity between 
Rorty‘s and Wittgenstein‘s goals as a vital reason to accept Rorty‘s 
invocation of Wittgenstein. I will identify Wittgensteinian concepts 
in Irigaray‘s feminism and establish a similar disparity in goals. I 
will then use a Wittgensteinian reading of Irigaray to illustrate the 
purpose and value of analyzing postmodern theory under a 
Wittgensteinian lens. Ultimately, I believe that it is through such a 
lens that we can better understand many postmodern approaches to 
the relationship between humans, language and the world. In 
particular, I will show in this paper that his conception of language 
as based on agreement in use is central to both Irigaray‘s feminism 
and Rorty‘s liberal ironism. 
 
I. Rorty’s Use of Wittgenstein 
Rorty refers to Wittgenstein‘s later work in order to argue 
against the prevailing acceptance of universality and representation 
of truth in political and philosophical systems. In Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity, he criticizes the basing of political systems 
on sweeping political theories and ideologies and proposes a new 
―politics of redescription.‖ In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 
he criticizes the epistemological tradition of Western philosophy, 
disparaging its perception of the ability to discover truth, and 
                                                 
1
 Bjorn Ramberg, ―Richard Rorty,‖ (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rorty/. 
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proposes a turn in philosophy toward a more conversational, less 
argumentative and truth-value-based approach. In both works, 
Rorty uses Wittgensteinian philosophy as a defense for his 
rejection of universalizing systems. 
In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty spells out 
implications of Wittgensteinian philosophy of language, 
identifying Wittgenstein as one important thinker who revealed the 
human-created, shifting nature of ―vocabularies.‖ Rorty‘s 
―vocabularies‖ can be thought of as analogous to Wittgensteinian 
―language-games‖ and refer to specific cultural collections of ways 
of thinking, communicating, and acting (ways of living). Rorty 
argues that if vocabularies are indeed created contingently and in 
constant shift, if they are ―optional and mutable,‖2 then the values 
they express, too, are optional and mutable. He asserts that neither 
the vocabularies nor their values should be imposed on anyone, 
and that political systems should seek to include multiple 
vocabularies. Such systems he terms ―liberal utopias,‖ inhabited by 
―liberal ironists‖ who would recognize their own contingency, 
acknowledging the possibility of shifting truth and shifting 
morality, which continue to change as they are influenced by 
different (contingent) factors. Seeking to provide people with the 
most freedom of expression possible and alleviate the most 
suffering possible (this is the ―liberal‖ part), they would promote 
their causes through redescriptions rather than arguments.
3
 
Like Nietzsche, Freud, and Donald Davidson, Wittgenstein 
is a stepping-stone on the path to Rorty‘s land of liberal utopias, 
                                                 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 9. 
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where we all recognize contingency. According to Rorty, 
Wittgenstein helped us along this path by revealing the 
contingency of language: In positing that language forms an 
objective framework based on agreement rather than adhering or 
corresponding to an (already-existing) objective framework, 
Wittgenstein makes us see language as a product of historical 
contingencies. Here it is useful to explore Rorty‘s use of Donald 
Davidson‘s philosophy of language, another stepping-stone. 
Davidson, like Wittgenstein, asserted that what makes language 
work is understanding between speakers, not expression of truth. 
Davidson‘s notion of ―passing theories‖ from his 1986 paper ―A 
Nice Derangment of Epitaphs‖ states that understanding between 
two linguistic beings occurs when their concepts of a word‘s 
meaning converge. Each person‘s concept of each word‘s meaning 
is in constant shift relative to context, so understanding – and 
meaning – are also in constant shift. This assertion helps us 
recognize the contingency of language by revealing its lack of 
necessity, like Darwin‘s theory of evolution revealed the 
contingency of the biology of species. 
 
Davidson lets us think of the history of 
language, and thus of culture, as Darwin taught 
us to think of the history of a coral reef. . . . Our 
language and our culture are as much a 
contingency, as much as a result of thousands of 
small mutations finding niches (and millions of 
others finding no niches), as are the orchids and 
the anthropoids.
4
 
 
                                                 
4
 Ibid., 16. 
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Just as the present state of species has depended on many 
contingent factors, so has our language. Rather than an expression 
of or correspondence to reality, it is somewhat a product of chance: 
Things could easily be otherwise. In addition, they are bound to 
continue to change. For this reason, according to Rorty, no singular 
ideology can be the right one: The circumstances under which 
ideologies and social theories come into being will never be static. 
As situations change, so should the vocabularies we use and the 
values on which our political systems are based. 
Rorty does for philosophy in Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature what he does for politics in Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity, presenting this idea of redescription rather than appeal 
to universal truth within the discipline of philosophy. In this book, 
Rorty criticizes the epistemological tradition and details what he 
sees as a necessary shift in Western philosophy. He uses the 
arguments of several philosophers, including Wittgenstein, to 
critique the representational view of knowledge central to 
traditional epistemology. According to Rorty, Wittgenstein, along 
with Sellars, Quine, Kuhn, and Davidson, showed that neither the 
mind nor language is capable of mirroring reality. Subsequently, 
the discipline of philosophy had to change, because epistemology 
ceased to make sense.
5
 As such, the traditional questions of 
philosophy are no longer relevant to our time. They are not, as 
many believe, timeless. The last sentence of his book reads, 
 
The only point on which I would insist is that 
the philosophers‘ moral concern should be with 
                                                 
5
 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979, 169. 
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continuing the conversation of the West, rather 
than with insisting upon a place for the 
traditional problems of modern philosophy 
within that conversation.
6
 
 
We should not ―insist on a place‖ for these traditional problems 
precisely because they will not, as so many philosophers have 
believed, lead us to discovery of universal truths. When we do 
philosophy, according to Rorty, we should neither assume that we 
operate outside the boundaries of contingency nor that we have a 
privileged ability to discover ―truth.‖ Rather than some sort of 
elevated search for truth, he claims that our Western tradition of 
philosophy is just another vocabulary (or language-game). 
Instead, as in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty 
would have us enter a more conversational approach. Once more, 
Wittgenstein‘s influence is clear. Under Rorty‘s ―naturally holistic 
conversational justification,‖ which he favors over the ―reductive 
and atomistic‖ justification of the epistemological tradition, social 
justification of belief creates knowledge. Just as language finds 
objectivity of meaning in social agreement under Wittgenstein, so 
does knowledge find objectivity of truth in social agreement under 
Rorty. Under this view, philosophy as a search for truth is 
nonsensical: We ―have no need to view [knowledge] as accuracy of 
representation‖ since ―we understand knowledge when we 
understand the social justification of belief.‖7 Rorty terms this view 
―epistemological behaviorism‖ and once again attributes his theory 
to Witgensteinian influence. 
                                                 
6
 Ibid., 394. 
7
 Ibid., 170. 
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Explaining rationality and epistemic authority 
by reference to what society lets us say, rather 
than the latter by the former, is the essence of 
what I shall call ‗epistemological behaviorism,‘ 
an attitude common to Dewey and 
Wittgenstein.
8
 
 
And for Rorty, if we recognize philosophy‘s inability to discover 
truth in any objective sense, then we should change the discipline. 
Just as in Contingency, Irony, and Soliarity, Rorty would have us 
reject a privileged, contingently created position of philosophy in 
favor of a conversational discipline inclusive of multiple language-
games. 
 A legitimate worry for many critics is that Rorty 
simultaneously makes normative claims while rejecting 
normativity. This may indeed be a problem for Rorty, but for the 
purposes of this paper it is not relevant. My task here is to show 
the validity of Rorty‘s invocation of Wittgenstein. Another worry is 
that in expounding on the created nature of meaning, Rorty is 
rejecting objectivity of meaning in any form; in ordinary words, 
for instance, like ―apple‖ or ―table.‖ Such a rejection would make 
Rorty an anti-realist. I do not think he aims to do this: Rorty‘s 
concern is primarily with the abandonment of essential identities in 
order to allow for shifting notions of selves, cultures, and truths. 
He makes this distinction himself in Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity. 
 
We need to make a distinction between the 
                                                 
8
 Ibid., 174. 
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claim that the world is out there and the claim 
that the truth is out there. To say that the world 
is out there, that it is not our creation, is to say, 
with common sense, that most things in space 
and time are the effects of causes which do not 
include human mental states. To say that the 
truth is not out there is simply to say that where 
there are no sentences there is no truth, that 
sentences are elements of human languages, and 
that human languages are human creations.
9
 
 
Rorty is decidedly not an anti-realist, though he does have a 
pluralist notion of truth: Since truth is not ―out there,‖ since it is 
created by humans, it can be created in many ways. The last worry 
I will explore in the next section: that in fact Rorty may not be able 
to use philosophers like Wittgenstein as he does; that he may be 
misrepresenting them and that his use of Wittgenstein may be 
unfounded. 
 
II. Is Rorty’s Use of Wittgenstein Valid? 
 Rorty makes bold claims when he uses philosophers like 
Wittgenstein to support his politics and philosophy of 
redescription. Is this use valid? We might ask, as some have: How 
can Rorty make the jump from Wittgenstein‘s notion of language 
as use to ―contingency of language‖ in Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity? Does Wittgenstein really exhibit language‘s 
contingency? Does Rorty accurately represent Wittgenstein in 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, when he cites Wittgenstein 
as one of the philosophers who changed the nature of 
                                                 
9
 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 5. 
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epistemology? Does he interpret Wittgenstein‘s notions of 
language-games and of language as agreement correctly? I argue 
first that he does in fact represent Wittgensteinian concepts of 
language accurately, and second that these questions are somewhat 
inappropriate, because Rorty and Wittgenstein have very different 
goals. Wittgenstein is trying to determine the nature of 
communication. His task is quite an apolitical one: He simply 
wishes to discover the true nature of language, and he discovers it 
to be a practice based on custom. Rorty has a larger goal in mind: 
He wishes both to convince us that all of our practices based on 
custom are not necessarily right, that we cannot justify anything 
with an appeal to ―truth‖ since everything we do and think is not 
necessary but contingent, and to propose new systems – of society 
and of philosophy – based on this recognition. It is because of this 
disparity of purpose that Rorty‘s use of Wittgenstein is not, as 
some critics have proposed, invalid. Rather, Wittgenstein‘s 
philosophy of language, like Darwin‘s theory of evolution, is 
useful to Rorty for purposes of illustration: Wittgenstein serves 
both as a useful comparison and as an important predecessor. In 
appealing to Wittgenstein, Rorty is simply laying out for the reader 
Wittgenstein‘s influence on his own theory. 
 Wolf Rehder is one of these critics. In ―Hermeneutics 
versus Stupidities of All Sorts: A Review-Discussion of R. Rorty‘s 
‗Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,‘‖ Rehder disparages Rorty 
for his use of philosophers like Wittgenstein. 
 
As witnesses for his holistic, antifoundationalist, 
and pragmatist new view of philosophy as 
hermeneutics, Rorty calls, among others, 
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Foucault, Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sartre, 
Kierkegaard, Quine, Gadamer, Feyerabend and 
Heidegger, a truly motley group of big names. 
However, he makes only makes a meager case 
against epistemology and traditional philosophy 
with this impressive phalanx of witnesses for 
the prosecution. It is not going too far to say that 
his backing up his case with this echelon of 
genuinely great men does not only not do justice 
to their philosophical work, but even tends to 
demean their work and their role in the history 
of philosophy. This is so, because Rorty‘s 
‗positive‘ case, his hermeneutic turn and 
proposed transcending of truth-oriented inquiry 
is, unfortunately, surprisingly naïve.
10
 
 
It is naïve, according to Rehder, because there cannot be useful 
conversation without conflict, nor can it exist without a common 
language or discourse. In Rehder‘s view, Rorty is proposing the 
opposite: agreement between different languages and discourses. 
―Any fruitful discussion is based on some sort of disagreement.‖11 
This is a commonly held view: To engage in conversation, we must 
share a language-game; and to debate, we must disagree. It seems 
to me, though, that in criticizing Rorty on this point Rehder is 
simply not taking Rorty seriously: Rorty‘s point is that useful 
conversation is possible – better, even – if it considers perspectives 
of multiple vocabularies. To say that useful conversation must 
happen within the same vocabulary is to refuse Rorty‘s proposed 
                                                 
10
 Wulf Rehder, ―Hermeneutics versus Stupidities of All Sorts: A Review-
Discussion of R. Rorty‘s ‗Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,‖ Zeitschrift für 
allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie / Journal for General Philosophy of Science 
14, no. 1 (1983): 95, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25170640. 
11
 Ibid., 96. 
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shift, to disregard his entire point of making the discourse of 
philosophy more inclusive of multiple language-games. Rorty‘s 
usage of all of these philosophers to defend his ―naïve‖ system 
obviously troubles Rehder. After all, he says, ―[It] does not only 
not do justice to their philosophical work, but even tends to 
demean their work and their role in the history of philosophy.‖ It is 
this criticism that I will now address. 
 First, Rorty does seem to accurately represent Wittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein created a new framework for objectivity based on 
social agreement rather than on truth. This agreement in no way 
determines truth or falsity, but instead forms a new standard of 
objectivity. In response to the invisible interlocutor in section 241, 
―So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and 
what is false?‖ Wittgenstein offers an alternative: ―It is what 
humans say that is true or false; and they agree in the language 
they use.‖12 Agreement does not determine truth in the world, only 
truth in our agreed-upon shared account of the world – in our 
shared language. It is this agreement that allows us to 
communicate with one another. People are understandable when 
their definitions accord with socially accepted ones. When Rorty 
says that Wittgenstein ―[explains] rationality and epistemic 
authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than the 
latter by the former,‖13  he seems to be correct: Wittgenstein‘s 
account of a socially formed objective framework does conform to 
Rorty‘s ―epistemological behaviorism,‖ as it locates objectivity in 
social accordance. 
                                                 
12
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1953), 88. 
13
 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 174. 
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 Second, it is useful to ask why Rorty appeals to ―this 
impressive phalanx of witnesses.‖ Does he aim to represent them? 
Given the difference in Rorty‘s and Wittgenstein‘s goals, strict 
adherence is not necessarily essential. Any apparent disparity 
between Rorty‘s Wittgenstein‘s systems is unimportant, because 
Rorty and Wittgenstein are not making the same kind of claim. 
They are not talking about the same kind of thing. When Rorty 
says, ―the truth is not out there,‖14 he does not mean that we create 
the objective world. Indeed, he explicitly distinguishes between 
―the claim that the truth is not out there and the claim that the 
world is not out there.‖15 He means that our social and cultural 
institutions, our beliefs, our methods of inquiry (like philosophy) 
are created in the same way that language is, in the same way that 
evolution is. Rorty does not really claim to adhere to Wittgenstein, 
so he cannot be criticized for it. In both Philosophy and the Mirror 
of Nature and Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty invokes 
Wittgenstein as an important influence, but not as his only 
influence. Where Wittgenstein‘s goal is to discover and describe, 
Rorty‘s is to reveal, convince, and change. 
 
III. Illumination Through Irigaray 
 Irigaray is Wittgensteinian in many of the same ways as 
Rorty: She holds a pluralist view of truth, rejects normativity, and 
uses Wittgenstein‘s notions of language-games and forms of life. 
But because she does not invoke Wittgenstein‘s name to defend her 
views, as Rorty does, she is never criticized for misrepresentation, 
                                                 
14
 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 5. 
15
 Ibid., 5. 
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as Rorty is. This fact reveals Rorty‘s immunity to such criticism. 
Her theory also illustrates the effectiveness of applying later 
Wittgensteinian philosophy to postmodern theories. Through an 
exploration of her work, I hope to show this usefulness. 
In To Speak Is Never Neutral, Irigaray questions the 
assumed impartiality of language and calls on us to recognize both 
its sexed nature as ―the language of man‖ (a title of one of her 
chapters) and its unfairly universalizing tendencies. She states in 
her introduction, ―This book is a questioning of the language of 
science, and an investigation into the sexualization of language, 
and the relation between the two.‖16 In ―Linguistic Sexes and 
Genders,‖ she identifies the sexism inherent in language, 
examining particular words in her native French. In ―This Sex 
Which Is Not One,‖ she states that ―female sexuality has always 
been theorized within masculine parameters‖17 and attempts to 
conceptualize it differently, outside these parameters. One of 
Irigaray‘s main concerns throughout her various works is to show 
how the current linguistic system is oppressive to women while 
claiming to be universally neutral, an idea clearly influenced by 
Wittgenstein, as I will show. Another concern is to show how 
change is possible through new feminist language-games, the 
details of which can be confusing and have been debated, but 
which is clarified through a Wittgensteinian reading of her theory. 
Irigaray uses the Wittgensteinian notion of language-games 
                                                 
16
 Luce Irigaray, To Speak Is Never Neutral, trans. Gail Schwab (New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 5. 
17
 Luce Irigaray, ―This Sex Which Is Not One,‖ trans. Claudia Reeder, in New 
French Feminisms, ed. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron (New York: 
Schoken Books, 1981), 99. 
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as well as his conception of objectivity as agreement to describe 
the problem of a universal language that is catered toward men but 
purported to apply to women as well. According to Irigaray, the 
language we accept as universal – the language of politics, of 
science, of philosophy – is actually an oppressive, particular 
language-game.  
 
A sexed subject imposes his imperatives as 
universally valid, and as the only ones capable 
of defining the forms of reason, of thought, of 
meaning, and of exchange. He still, and always, 
comes back to the same logic, the only logic: of 
the One, of the Same. Of the Same of the One.
18
 
 
Just as, in Wittgenstein, we cannot form a private language because 
all words we use are defined by the linguistic community, so, in 
Irigaray, is it nearly impossible to escape from the purportedly 
universal dominating male language-game. In the same vein as 
Rorty, Irigaray questions the value of rationality and criticizes the 
language of traditional philosophy, which is decidedly male and 
which is imposed on women while masking itself as universal to 
all.  
 
From [Irigaray‘s] point of view, the 
philosophers, of whatever persuasion, are 
comfortably installed in the male imaginary, so 
comfortably that they are completely unaware of 
the sexuate character of ‗universal‘ thought.19 
 
                                                 
18
 Irigaray, To Speak Is Never Neutral, 228. 
19
 Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine (New York: 
Routledge, 1991), 103. 
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How, then, is feminist theory even possible? The problem is as 
follows: ―Not using logic risks maintaining the other‘s status as 
infans . . . Using logic means abolishing difference and 
resubmitting to the same imperatives.‖20 If we operate outside the 
dominating language-game, we will not be taken seriously, and if 
we operate within it, we are giving in, trying to fit ourselves into 
the oppressive system. 
Irigaray‘s solution, possible under Wittgensteinian 
influence, is to form a new language-game that challenges this 
discourse. Irigaray appeals to the female body in the formation of a 
new language of feminism, under two assumptions: First, that the 
male body is already intrinsic to philosophy – in ethics, for 
instance, where the point is to enhance positive effects on the body 
(e.g., health) and circumvent negative effects (e.g., death). Second, 
that the female body is currently defined by male desire and male 
language.
21
 The body is important both in the symbolic and in its 
realized form for Irigaray. Rather than being forced to conform 
either to the supposedly universal language of men, based on the 
male body, or to form a new language based on the male-created 
female body, ―the female body has to be allowed its own imaginary 
existence in the form of symbolic difference.‖22 This imaginary 
existence can only be realized by privileging female life, female 
sexuality, and the real female body, as they are ―for themselves.‖23 
Irigaray‘s solution is Wittgensteinian because it relies on 
Wittgenstein‘s notions of language-games as flexible, changing 
                                                 
20
 Irigaray, To Speak Is Never Neutral, 228. 
21
 Whitford, Luce Irigaray, 150. 
22
 Ibid., 103. 
23
 Irigaray, ―This Sex Which Is Not One,‖ 106. 
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and organic and of language as a form of life. Formation of a new 
language-game is possible because language-games are always 
coming into and out of being. The female body itself is an 
important part of the female form of life, and so can be appealed to 
in Irigaray‘s formation of a new feminine language-game. 
Importantly, Irigaray does not declare herself 
Wittgensteinian; but a Wittgensteinian reading of Irigaray both 
makes sense, as I have shown, and clarifies some aspects of her 
solution. Joyce Davidson and Mick Smith show how such a 
Wittgensteinian reading clarifies and does justice to Irigaray in 
―Wittgenstein and Irigaray: Philosophy and Gender in a Language 
(Game) of Difference.‖ Specifically, a Wittgensteinian reading 
solves an interpretative conflict among Irigaray scholars. Critics 
have typically either called Irigaray essentialist, which she 
explicitly claims not to be (her disparagement of universalizing 
language is clearly anti-essentialist) or as speaking in metaphor or 
symbolism when she speaks about the body (since they know she 
is anti-essentialist, they cannot imagine she would invoke the real 
body). Even Margaret Whitford, a prominent Irigaray scholar, 
acknowledges the difficulty of reading Irigaray, in that ―we are not 
quite sure what status is given to Irigaray‘s statements.‖24 She 
wonders whether they are ―empirical descriptions . . . ideal 
descriptions . . . descriptions of the reigning imaginary . . . or 
perhaps simply metaphors again.‖25 Reading Irigaray under a 
Wittgensteinian lens, say Davidson and Smith, ―might provide a 
                                                 
24
 Whitford, Luce Irigaray, 102. 
25
 Ibid. 
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third alternative‖26 and solve this conflict: Through Wittgenstein, 
we can come to terms with Irigaray‘s simultaneous rejection of 
essentialism and appeal to the body in formation of a new, 
subversive, feminine language-game. Wittgenstein‘s notion of 
―blurred concepts‖ or ―family resemblances‖ lets us recognize the 
possibility of using something like the female body to create a new 
language-game without essentializing it. 
 
Women‘s anatomy might be understood as a real 
component of the patterns, context, and 
environment that might give rise to a feminine 
language-game. So, while anatomy is not an 
essential referent to which language must be 
fixed, it is a valid and pertinent feature of a 
feminine form of life.
27
 
 
Wittgenstein told us that definitions need not always be fixed, that 
a ―the indistinct [picture] is often exactly what we need.‖28 In the 
same way, female anatomy need not be essentialized to serve as a 
reference point for the creation of a feminine language-game. We 
see, then, that Wittgensteinian philosophy does not only manifest 
itself in Irigaray‘s theory; it can also help clarify it. 
 
IV. A Difference of Goals: Language and Power 
 Like Rorty, Irigaray has a political goal, one that is vastly 
different from Wittgenstein‘s descriptive one. Rorty and Irigaray 
                                                 
26
 Joyce Davidson and Mick Smith, ―Wittgenstein and Irigaray: Gender and 
Philosophy in a Language (Game) of  Difference,‖ Hypatia 14, no. 2 (1999): 83, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810769. 
27
 Ibid., 84. 
28
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 34. 
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both assume that language has power: In both of their theories, it is 
language that oppresses and language that has the power to 
liberate. This relationship between language and power was termed 
―discourse‖ by Michel Foucault, and refers to language and other 
shared aspects of culture as a mechanism that perpetuates itself 
through use, never calling itself into question. Central to this idea 
is the Wittgensteinian one that language is based on agreement in 
use, that social agreement in use forms the objective frameworks 
within which we communicate. Wittgenstein was the philosopher 
to assert that there was no ideal language capable of representing 
reality. Maxine Greene says in ―Postmodernism and the Crisis of 
Representation‖ that our postmodern task ―may be a matter of 
recognizing that there is no single-dimensional medium reflective 
of the ‗facts‘ of the world, but a multiplicity of language games, as 
Ludwig Wittgenstein made so clear.‖29 Postmodern thinkers like 
Foucault, Rorty, and Irigaray, as well as Judith Butler, Monique 
Wittig, and Edward Said, among others, have accepted this task, 
drawing out the social and political implications of Wittgensteinian 
philosophy of language. 
 Wittgenstein thus proves to be invaluable to postmodern 
theories of language and power: Though Wittgenstein never 
approaches the social and political ideas that theorists like Rorty 
and Irigaray do, his work is ultimately their basis. For this reason, 
and as we have seen through these two case studies, a 
Wittgensteinian reading of postmodern theories helps us 
understand them. 
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V. Eliminating False Clarity: The Value of Wittgenstein-
Influenced Postmodern Theory 
Both Rorty and Irigaray use Wittgensteinian notions of 
language and social agreement to call into question the universality 
we so often use to solve political, philosophical, and scientific 
problems. Irigaray questions the universality of political, 
philosophical, and scientific language, while Rorty questions the 
ability of universalizing, truth-seeking systems of politics and 
philosophy to provide us with acceptable solutions. I once heard in 
an ecology class that ―our best chance of solving problems is to 
recognize the complexity of the situation rather than appeal to an 
ideology.‖ The professor said such an appeal gives us ―false 
clarity.‖ It seems to me that this is true, that more realistic views do 
not think themselves universal, and that Rorty‘s and Irigaray‘s 
Wittgenstein-influenced theories that seek to reveal the complexity 
of the situation in lieu of the false clarity of universalizing 
political, philosophical, and linguistic systems are ones to consider 
with utmost seriousness and thoughtfulness. 
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